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The Paradox of Plenty

Mining Capital and the Underdevelopment of Northern Australia, 1945-2015

Abstract: Northern Australia contains most of the nation's mineral wealth and over half its land mass. Despite this, it remains underdeveloped compared to the southeast and is home to only 5.2 per cent of the national population. This article charts the history and impact of mining capital in northern Australia in the six decades after the conclusion of World War II. It argues that extractive industry dominated by multinational capital has actively perpetuated northern Australia's underdevelopment rather than driving regional prosperity.

In February 2012, mining heiress Gina Rinehart unveiled her vision for northern Australia. Her poem 'Our Future', engraved on a plaque fixed to a 30-tonne iron ore boulder at a Perth shopping centre, called for developing North Australia through foreign investment and resource extraction. "Develop North Australia, embrace multiculturalism and welcome short term foreign workers," she wrote, "to benefit from the export of our minerals and ores".¹ This public monument appeared during Australia's bitter 'mining tax debacle' from 2010-2014 when corporate resistance successfully defeated federal government attempts to capture greater returns from resource extraction.²

Rinehart's vision crystallises a fundamental paradox in northern Australian development that has persisted for over seven decades. Despite containing most of Australia's mineral wealth and comprising 53 per cent of the continent's land-mass, northern Australia remains home to only 5.2 per cent of the national population. While mining accounts for 7.7 per cent of the region's workforce compared to 1.9 per cent nationally, this resource abundance has not translated into sustained regional development or population growth.

Northern Australia encompasses approximately four million square kilometres, an area larger than India, yet supports 1.4 million residents only. This low population density persists despite containing world-class deposits of iron ore, coal, uranium, bauxite, gold, and natural gas that generate billions in export revenues annually for predominantly foreign-owned companies. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples comprise 17.4 per cent of northern Australia's population compared to 3.1 per cent nationally.³

This article argues that export-oriented resource extraction has actively perpetuated northern Australia's underdevelopment rather than driving regional prosperity. Through historical analysis spanning 1945-2015, it demonstrates how the structure of the mining industry, 83 per cent foreign-owned by 2010, has

1 Gina Rinehart: Our Future.

2 See Sinclair Davidson: The Mining Tax Debacle, p. 21.

3 See Office of Northern Australia: Northern Australia Action Plan 2024-2029.

systematically channelled northern Australia's mineral wealth offshore while providing minimal lasting benefits to regional communities.⁴

The analysis posits four critical phases in this process of extractive under-development. First, the post-1945 transformation established northern Australia as a resource extraction zone serving Asian industrialisation. Second, successive mining booms from the 1960s onward deepened patterns of foreign ownership and control while gradually entrenching fly-in, fly-out employment models. Third, the spectacular failure of the mining tax experiment (2010-2014) demonstrated the political impossibility of redirecting resource wealth toward regional development. Fourth, the China boom of the 2000s intensified these patterns while introducing new forms of foreign ownership and control.

Northern Australia's experience challenges orthodox assumptions about the relationship between resource endowments and regional development. Rather than providing a foundation for prosperity, mineral wealth has become a mechanism for extracting value from the region while providing minimal lasting benefits to local communities.

Colonial Foundations and Early Settlement Patterns (1870s-1945)

Understanding northern Australia's contemporary development challenges requires examining how colonial settlement patterns established the extractive relationships that persist today. European settlement in northern Australia proceeded differently from the southern colonies, creating patterns of extensive land use and external dependency that would later influence mining development.

The Cattle Frontier

The cattle industry emerged as the dominant economic activity from the 1870s onward, eventually covering approximately 2.5 million square kilometres or 60 per cent of northern Australia's land area.⁵ This extensive pastoral system supported relatively few people across vast distances, creating the sparse population distribution that characterises the region today. The pastoral frontier established several crucial features that would later influence mining development. For example, infrastructure networks were oriented primarily toward export markets rather than regional centres, although ports also serviced domestic markets and economic spillover effects benefited port towns such as Townsville and Rockhampton. Furthermore, pastoral enterprises on the northern frontier required significant investment from the outset which left the door open for foreign ownership and control when the shallow pool of domestic savings was exhausted. According to Dawn May, northern squatters in the 1860s were typically owner-managers with investors ranging from silent partners, family

4 See Michael Janda: Mixed Reaction to Greens' Mining Profits Report.

5 See Office of Northern Australia: Northern Australia Action Plan 2024-2029.

members or business houses.⁶ The labour-power making all of this possible was mediated through the emergence of a dual economy where European settlers owned and controlled land while Aboriginal peoples were largely excluded from economic participation beyond earning wages. Indeed, as May argues, many station owners from the 1870s were only able to retain their holdings by using low or unpaid Aboriginal labour.⁷

Early Mining and Extractive Patterns

Early mineral discoveries followed the same extractive patterns established by the pastoral industry. Gold rushes in North Queensland during the 1870s and 1880s attracted temporary populations who extracted wealth before departing, leaving minimal lasting infrastructure. The Palmer River goldfield supported over 18 000 miners at its peak between 1877-1880 but was virtually abandoned within a decade when easily accessible deposits were exhausted, demonstrating the boom-bust cycles that would characterise northern Australian resource development.⁸ To be clear, there were several northern mining fields that enjoyed relatively long lifespans, including goldfields at Charters Towers and Ravenswood, and mineral fields surrounding Chillagoe. Mount Morgan in Central Queensland is another example of a relatively long-lived mine with adjoining settlement.⁹ Boom-bust cycles characterise the volatility of mineral prices on global markets that may or may not correspond to the closure of mining settlements reliant upon the buoyancy of demand for specific minerals. Colin Hooper's recent work reveals 524 "abandoned boom-and-bust mining towns" across north Queensland alone.¹⁰

These early mining experiences established patterns that would characterise later developments: predominantly male, temporary populations rather than family settlers; wealth largely exported from the region rather than invested locally; and boom-bust cycles that prevented the accumulation of capital necessary for sustained development. Early mining operations also demonstrated the challenges of establishing processing industries in northern Australia, with the region's distance from major markets making it cheaper to export raw materials for processing elsewhere. Although as Megarrity has pointed out there was a sense of permanency in places like Ravenswood, Chillagoe and Charters Towers from the 1870s until most residents moved to Townsville and other regional towns by the 1910s. Processing operations did gradually tend to move to distant locations like Cockle Creek in New South Wales or Maryborough in Queensland but only after local processing was attempted and deemed untenable.¹¹

The extractive orientation also established exploitative relationships with Aboriginal peoples that would intensify with later mining developments. Mining

6 See Dawn May: *From Bush To Station*, p. 11.

7 See *ibid.*, pp. 1 f.

8 See Gordon Grimwade, Christine Grimwade: *Shattered Dreams*, p. 440.

9 See Lyndon Megarrity: *Northern Dreams*, pp. 20-116.

10 Phil Brandel: *Abandoned Boom-And-Bust Mining Towns of Far North Queensland Measured by How Many Pubs They Had*.

11 See Lyndon Megarrity: *Northern Dreams*, p. 20.

operations frequently destroyed traditional food sources and sacred sites while employing Indigenous people under conditions that amounted to forced labour, creating legal frameworks that facilitated extraction while marginalising traditional owners.¹²

Post-War Transformation

Establishing Resource Dependence (1945-1970)

The transformation of northern Australia into a resource extraction zone began with the collapse of British imperial trade networks after 1945, fundamentally altering the region's development trajectory and establishing patterns that persist today. Lucrative preferential deals between Australia and Britain on commodities such as meat would remain in place for several years into the post-war period due to representations by the Australian government during Anglo-American loan negotiations from September-December 1945.¹³ But the emergence of the Bretton Woods institutions and the implementation of their processes designed to ameliorate trade and financial imbalances across capitalist economies would create the preconditions for import-substitution-industrialisation in Australia.

Reorienting Trade Networks

The disintegration of the British Empire forced Australia to seek new markets, particularly in Asia, with profound implications for northern Australia. The region became the primary source of raw materials for Asian industrialisation as large-scale mining operations targeted export markets in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This transition represented a fundamental shift from pastoral activities serving primarily Australian and British markets to mining operations integrated into Asian industrial development.

The Great Mineral Discoveries

The 1950s and 1960s witnessed unprecedented mineral discoveries across northern Australia, fundamentally altering global perceptions of the region's economic potential. Harry Evans' discovery of vast bauxite deposits at Weipa in the Gulf of Carpentaria in 1955 exemplifies both the scale and limitations of these developments. The Weipa deposit contained an estimated three billion tonnes of high-grade bauxite, sufficient to supply global aluminium production for decades.¹⁴

12 See Raymond Evans: "Kings" in *Brass Crescents*, p. 198.

13 See Francine McKenzie: *Redefining the Bonds Of Commonwealth, 1939-1948*, p. 152.

14 See Max Griffiths: *Of Mines and Men*, p. 39.

However, Weipa's development established patterns that would characterise later mining projects and limit their regional benefits. The deposit was developed by a consortium dominated by foreign companies, with processing occurring overseas rather than in northern Australia despite the region's advantages for aluminium production. Workers were flown in from southern cities rather than recruited locally, and the operation functioned as an enclave with minimal integration into the regional economy.

Uranium discoveries at Rum Jungle (1949) and Mary Kathleen (1954) positioned northern Australia as a major supplier of nuclear materials during the Cold War period.¹⁵ Iron ore discoveries in Western Australia's Pilbara region proved most significant for northern Australia's long-term development trajectory, establishing the foundation for contemporary mining dominance. The Pilbara discoveries in Northwest Australia contained billions of tonnes of high-grade ore that would underpin decades of expansion, but mining operations were established as isolated industrial facilities with minimal connections to existing regional centres.¹⁶

The Japan Connection

Japan's post-war industrialisation created enormous demand for northern Australian resources, establishing the foundation for the region's integration into Asian supply chains. The 1957 bilateral trade agreement between Australia and Japan established formal frameworks for resource exports. Following Menzies' so-called 'man to man' election speech in 1955, in which he extols the virtues of "co-operative Liberalism" to warrant "intensified [...] import restrictions" under the aegis of "Divine Providence, by co-operative social effort," Australians are offered economic prosperity, and the new enemy of "Communist bandits in Malaya," to assuage any residual resentments owing to the horrors of the Second World War in the Pacific.¹⁷

Despite formal commitments to import-substitution-industrialisation (ISI), which should have subsidised the growth of domestic manufacturing capacity through redistribution of export tax receipts, the new trade relationship was fundamentally asymmetrical, with northern Australia providing raw materials while Japan captured the benefits of processing and manufacturing.¹⁸ Moreover, the point of ISI was to anticipate and address the deterioration of terms of trade observed by Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer as the long-run consequence of national economies relying on the export of primary goods to optimise so-called comparative advantage in a system of international free trade.

By the time Japan overtook Britain as Australia's leading export destination in 1966/67, the spillover effects that typically accompany ISI development strategies might have been expected to materialise around the sites of extraction in

15 See Geoffrey Blainey: *The Rush that Never Ended*, pp. 335 ff.

16 See Sydney Morning Herald, 15 July 1963, p. 48 (Harold Raggatt: Major Importance of Discoveries).

17 Robert G. Menzies: *Australian Federal Election Speeches 1955*.

18 See Australian Bureau of Statistics: *Yearbook Australia 1973*, p. 289.

northern Australia. Paul Keating's famous 'banana republic' warning in 1986 characterised the success of co-operative Liberalism in observing that in the 1970s "we became a third world economy selling raw materials and food and we let the sophisticated industrial side fall apart".¹⁹

By 1971/72, metalliferous ores and metal scrap comprised the largest export category to Japan at \$425 million, representing 31 per cent of total Australian exports. Coal exports added another \$199 million, while together these northern Australian primary products constituted over 60 per cent of Australian exports to Japan. This demonstrated the region's central role while highlighting the concentration of trade in unprocessed raw materials.

Japanese imports of Australian goods grew from \$98 million in 1951/52 to \$1.36 billion by 1971/72, a fourteen-fold increase that established northern Australia as an integral component of Japanese industrial development.²⁰ However, these relationships were structured to serve Japan's rather than northern Australia's development priorities, with processing and manufacturing remaining concentrated in Japan.

Early Foreign Investment Patterns

The capital requirements for developing northern Australia's mineral deposits exceeded domestic capacity, necessitating foreign investment that established patterns of foreign ownership and control. Foreign companies typically retained majority ownership, made key operational decisions offshore, and structured their activities to minimise Australian tax obligations while maximising returns to overseas shareholders.

The Mount Newman iron ore project exemplifies these patterns. Developed by a consortium, including British, American, and Japanese companies, the project required massive investments in railway and port infrastructure. However, these partnerships were structured to serve the partners' home country interests rather than northern Australian development needs. The Japanese steel industry, for example, hailed the 1965 Mount Newman contract setting price schedules for production due to begin in 1969, as "an astonishingly good one for Japan".²¹ Ore was shipped directly to overseas steel mills rather than supporting domestic processing industries, equipment was sourced globally rather than from northern Australian suppliers, and employment remained limited despite well-paid positions.

19 Tom Conley: Revisiting the Banana Republic and Other Familiar Destinations.

20 See *ibid.*, p. 301.

21 David Lee: *The Establishment of Iron Ore Giants*, p. 68.

Deepening Dependence

Mining Booms and Foreign Ownership and Control (1970-2000)

The 1970s energy boom and subsequent mining expansions deepened foreign ownership and control over northern Australia's resources while further entrenching the region's role as a raw materials supplier to global markets.

The Energy Boom

Northern Australia's energy resources attracted massive foreign investment during the 1970s oil price shocks. The Northwest Shelf project off Western Australia's coast became the flagship development, representing one of the largest resource investments in Australian history. The project involved natural gas reserves estimated at over 300 000 million cubic meters, requiring investments exceeding \$8 billion over the construction and production phases.²² However, the project was developed by a consortium dominated by international companies, including Shell, BP, and Chevron, with Japanese utilities as major customers through long-term purchase agreements that prioritised export markets over domestic industrial development. The project was structured as an export facility serving Asian markets rather than supporting domestic industrial development, with natural gas processed into liquefied natural gas for shipment to Japan and other national markets in Asia.²³

Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser's optimistic proclamation in 1980 that prospective development had reached \$29 billion reflected the extraordinary scale of planned investments and hopes for sustained regional development.²⁴ However, this enthusiasm overlooked the structural arrangements that would limit northern Australia's benefits, particularly the foreign ownership patterns and export orientation that characterised the projects.

The boom's end in 1982/83 revealed the vulnerability of northern Australia's resource-dependent economy. When global demand collapsed due to recession, projects were cancelled, workers departed, and regional communities faced economic decline. This boom-bust pattern would characterise subsequent mining cycles across northern Australia, demonstrating the risks of depending on export markets and foreign investment.

Consolidating Foreign Ownership

The mining expansions of the 1970s and 1980s deepened patterns of foreign ownership and control across northern Australian operations. By 1978, the Australian mining industry was 59 per cent foreign owned and controlled, with northern

22 See Peter J. Higgs, Alan A. Powell: Australia's North-West Shelf Gas Project, pp. 179f.

23 See Peter Ellery: *Born in Fire*, pp. 93f.

24 See Tom Conley: *The Politics of Prosperity*, p. 122.

Australian operations featuring even higher levels due to their capital intensity and export orientation.²⁵ Fuel minerals reached 73 per cent foreign control, black coal 59 per cent, petroleum 84 per cent, tin 81 per cent, and silver, lead and zinc 75 per cent. Most foreign investment originated from the United States, establishing American corporate control over much of northern Australia's resource base and creating dependency relationships that served American industrial and strategic interests during the Cold War period.²⁶

The Fitzgerald Report of 1974 revealed that during 1967-1973, Australian governments received \$286 million in taxes and royalties from mining but granted \$341 million in concessions, resulting in a \$55 million net loss.²⁷ Foreign ownership meant that strategic decisions about northern Australia's development were made in corporate boardrooms in New York, London, and Tokyo rather than in regional centres. This external control limited opportunities for local value-adding and constrained regional economic diversification by prioritising global efficiency considerations over regional development needs.

The Resource Processing Gap

Perhaps the most significant consequence of foreign control was the systematic failure to develop processing industries in northern Australia. The bauxite industry exemplifies this pattern: In 1979, Australian companies earned \$800 million from bauxite and alumina exports, primarily from northern Australian deposits. However, processing these materials into aluminium would have generated \$4 billion—five times the raw material value—while creating substantial employment and industrial capacity.²⁸

Northern Australia possessed clear advantages for aluminium processing: abundant energy resources, proximity to bauxite deposits, access to Asian markets, and available land for large-scale industrial facilities. However, foreign-owned mining companies preferred to ship raw materials to existing facilities in their home countries, or the last vestiges of onshore processing capacity in places like Gladstone, Newcastle and Port Kembla south of the Tropic of Capricorn, missing opportunities to develop northern Australian industrial capacity.²⁹

This processing gap represented foregone opportunities for value-added employment, industrial development, and regional economic diversification. The result was a classic colonial relationship where northern Australia provided raw materials while value-added processing occurred elsewhere, limiting employment opportunities and constraining regional development.

25 See United Nations: *Transnational Corporations in World Development*, p. 60.

26 See Gregory J. Crough: *Foreign Ownership and Control of the Australian Minerals Industry*.

27 See Tom M. Fitzgerald: *The Contribution of the Mineral Industry to Australian Welfare*, p. 6.

28 See Humphrey McQueen: *Gone Tomorrow*, p. 53.

29 See Gregory J. Crough, Edward L. Wheelwright: *Australia*, p. 16.

The Mining Tax Debacle Corporate Power and Democracy (2010-2014)

The conflict over mining taxation between 2010 and 2014 provides a crucial case study of how foreign-dominated corporations and their locally based sycophants successfully resisted government attempts to capture greater benefits from northern Australia's resource wealth, revealing the political power of transnational mining companies vis-a-vis democratically elected national governments.

The Resource Super Profits Tax Proposal

On 2 May 2010, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced a Resource Super Profits Tax (RSPT) based on recommendations from the Henry Tax Review. The proposed tax aimed to capture 40 per cent of 'super profits' from mining operations, potentially generating \$12 billion annually in additional revenue. The tax recognised that mineral resources belonged to the Australian people rather than foreign corporations that had gradually gained control over their extraction.

The RSPT was particularly relevant to northern Australia, where foreign-owned companies extracted vast wealth while regional communities received minimal benefits beyond employment and limited royalty payments. For northern Australia, this revenue represented a genuinely transformative opportunity that could have addressed decades of underinvestment in regional development. The national infrastructure deficit was estimated at between \$450-\$700 billion in February 2017, with inadequate roads, communications systems, health facilities, and educational institutions constraining economic development.³⁰

The Industry Campaign

The mining industry's response demonstrated the political power that foreign owned and controlled corporations could mobilise to influence Australian domestic policy. Companies spent approximately \$100 million on advertising campaigns designed to discredit the proposed tax, representing one of the largest corporate political campaigns in Australian history.³¹

The campaign was coordinated by the Minerals Council of Australia and employed advanced political messaging techniques, focus group testing, and targeted advertising. The industry's messaging strategy was particularly sophisticated in its targeting of northern Australian constituencies, presenting the RSPT as a threat to regional employment rather than an opportunity to redirect mining wealth toward regional development.

Ironically, this massive expenditure was tax-deductible under existing corporate tax provisions, meaning Australian taxpayers subsidised corporate

30 See Shane V. Styn: *Regional Capitals Australia*, p. 3.

31 See Ian McAuley: *Taxing the Miners' Uncommonly Large Profits*, p. 25.

opposition to the mining tax to the tune of \$30 million.³² The campaign also revealed international coordination, with foreign owned and controlled companies sharing strategies across multiple jurisdictions and leveraging their global operations to maximise political pressure.

Political Consequences

The mining industry's campaign proved devastatingly effective. Within 52 days of announcing the tax, Kevin Rudd was removed as Labor Party leader and replaced by Julia Gillard. On her first day as Prime Minister, Gillard cancelled government advertising supporting the mining tax. A week later, she announced a 'deal' with mining companies that would replace the RSPT with a much weaker alternative.

This political intervention demonstrated the power of foreign owned and controlled mining companies to influence Australian domestic policy in ways that revealed fundamental tensions between democratic governance and transnational corporate power. For example, Rio Tinto Chief Executive Tom Albanese made the following remark in a speech to mining executives in London ten days after Rudd was ousted by Gillard in 2010: "Policymakers around the world can learn a lesson when considering a new tax to plug a revenue gap, or to play local politics".³³ The industry's success showed how strategic corporate collaboration could overwhelm democratic processes, particularly in resource-dependent regions where companies possessed concentrated economic leverage.

The Weakened Mining Tax

The Mineral Resources Rent Tax (MRRT) that replaced the RSPT represented a significant victory for mining companies. The MRRT applied only to iron ore and coal operations, exempting gold, uranium, base metals, and natural gas projects. For covered operations, the tax included generous allowances and exemptions that reduced effective tax rates substantially below the nominal 30 per cent rate.

The revenue impact was devastating. In its first full year of operation (2012/13), the tax raised just \$126 million against original projections of \$3 billion annually from the RSPT. Rio Tinto reportedly paid nothing at all under the new arrangements, while BHP Billiton's payments remained minimal relative to its substantial northern Australian operations.³⁴

The MRRT was finally repealed in September 2014 by the Abbott government. From inception to repeal, the mining tax experiment lasted just over four years, influenced the fortunes of four Prime Ministers, and demonstrated the political

³² See *ibid.*

³³ The Weekend Australian, 10 July 2010, p. 28 (Peter Wilson: Rio Chief Uses Rudd Case as Warning – Mining Tax Battle).

³⁴ See M. Chambers: Rio Tinto Pays No Mining Tax.

impossibility of challenging foreign corporate control over Australian resources under existing institutional arrangements.

Contemporary Challenges

The China Boom and Beyond (2000-2015)

The early twenty-first century witnessed unprecedented mining expansion across northern Australia, driven primarily by growth of economic output in China. However, this latest boom intensified rather than resolved the region's development challenges, further entrenching patterns of foreign ownership and control of export-oriented extractive industry.

The China Boom

Economic growth in China from 2000 onward created massive demand for northern Australian resources. Exports to China from Australia increased from approximately \$10 billion in 2003/04 to \$107 billion by 2013/14, with iron ore and coal from northern Australia comprising the largest components. By 2023, Australia provided 64 per cent of China's iron ore imports, establishing northern Australia as a crucial supplier for steel production in Asia.³⁵

This surge in demand drove unprecedented investment in northern Australian mining infrastructure. The Pilbara region experienced massive expansion, with new mines, railways, and port facilities. Individual projects like the Gorgon natural gas development required investments exceeding \$60 billion, while iron ore expansions across the Pilbara totalled over \$100 billion during peak boom years.³⁶

However, the benefits remained concentrated among foreign shareholders rather than northern Australian communities. Mining employment increased from 113 800 in May 2005 to 321 300 workers across Australia during the boom, representing substantial growth but limited impact relative to the massive capital investments involved. Much of this employment was provided through fly-in, fly-out arrangements that limited regional economic benefits. Moreover, when adjusted for population growth, the percentage of the labour force in Australia working in mining has remained just above 2 per cent in the 20 years to 2025.³⁷

Intensifying Foreign Ownership

The China boom deepened patterns of foreign ownership and control in extractive industry while introducing new forms of external control through foreign

35 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Trade Time Series Data.

36 See Department of Industry Science and Resources: Resources and Energy Major Projects 2017.

37 See Jobs and Skills Australia: Mining Employment.

direct investment originating in Asia. By 2010, approximately 83 per cent of the Australian mining industry was foreign-owned, with northern Australian operations featuring even higher concentrations of foreign control due to their scale and strategic importance.

Chinese companies joined American, British, and Japanese investors in acquiring northern Australian assets. Chinalco's attempted acquisition of Rio Tinto assets, Sinosteel's purchase of Midwest Corporation, and various other Chinese investments represented a new phase of foreign ownership that reflected China's growing economic power and resource security concerns while creating additional layers of external control.³⁸

This intensification occurred with minimal government resistance, despite growing public concerns about foreign control of critical infrastructure. The Foreign Investment Review Board approved virtually all applications for foreign investment in northern Australian mining, often with limited conditions and minimal consideration of regional development implications. One inflection point worth noting is the abolition of the "50 per cent Australian equity and control guideline for participation in new mining projects, and the economic benefits test for takeovers of existing mining businesses" on 26 February 1992 as part of the Keating government's One Nation Economic Statement.³⁹

The Expansion of Fly-In, Fly-Out Employment

Perhaps the most significant development during this period was the massive expansion of fly-in, fly-out employment arrangements across northern Australia from the 1960s.⁴⁰ Rather than establishing permanent mining towns, companies increasingly flew workers in for rotational shifts and returned them to southern Australian cities, maximising operational flexibility while minimising regional development commitments.

The FIFO model enabled companies to access skilled workers from southern Australian labour markets without establishing permanent communities, provided operational flexibility to scale employment rapidly, and reduced infrastructure and community development obligations. However, FIFO arrangements created significant challenges for northern Australian regional development. Mining workers earned high wages that could have supported regional economic development, but they spent most of their income in Perth, Brisbane, or other southern cities, or coastal areas in the north, where they maintained primary residences. The data is patchy on where exactly workers on remote mine sites fly or drive from, and return to, but the reaction of Kalgoorlie-Boulder Mayor, Ron Yurevich, to a study commissioned by the Minerals Council of Australia on FIFO work in 2013 is interesting to note: "Regional areas will suffer and will die if mining industry and governments don't acknowledge and don't support those

38 See Emma Alberici: China May Stall BHP-Rio Tinto Merger.

39 Foreign Investment Review Board: Report 2001-02, p. 82.

40 See Geoff Bull: Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Regional Australia Inquiry, p. 6.

communities when they have mining developments occurring in and around their areas".⁴¹

For Indigenous communities, FIFO arrangements often represented the worst aspects of mining development, combining economic disruption with cultural marginalisation and providing minimal opportunities for inclusive development. Mining operations disrupted traditional territories while providing limited employment opportunities for local Indigenous people, who often lacked the formal qualifications required for mining employment.⁴²

Environmental and Social Costs

The expansion of mining imposed significant environmental and social costs that were rarely factored into development planning. Open-cut mining operations transformed vast areas of northern Australian landscape, removing vegetation and creating permanent changes to regional environments. Water rights became increasingly contentious as mining operations competed with pastoral, agricultural, and Indigenous community needs for access to limited water resources. Indeed, despite Indigenous land now exceeding 30 per cent of total land in Australia, Indigenous-held "water access entitlements" are 0.01 per cent only of total Australian water allocations.⁴³

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities bore disproportionate environmental and social costs, continuing historical patterns of dispossession and marginalisation. Sacred sites were damaged despite legal protections, traditional economic activities were disrupted, and communities faced ongoing pressure to accept mining developments with limited capacity to influence their terms.

Rinehart's Vision and Persistent Constraints

Gina Rinehart's advocacy for northern Australian development through Australians for Northern Development and Economic Vision (ANDEV) exemplifies both the recognition of northern Australia's development challenges and the enduring logic of extractivism to which they owe. Despite acknowledging northern Australia's underdevelopment, Rinehart's proposed solutions deepen rather than challenge the foreign-dominated resource extraction model.

ANDEV promotes reducing taxes and regulations while embracing "free market entrepreneurs" as the solution to northern Australia's development challenges.⁴⁴ The organisation's emphasis reflects Rinehart's longstanding political and economic philosophy while ignoring substantial evidence that favourable

41 ABC News: FIFO Study Finds One in Five Work in Mining Sector.

42 See Samy Leyton-Flor, Kamaljit Sangha: *The Socio-Ecological Impacts of Mining on the Well-Being of Indigenous Australians*, p. 2.

43 Lily O'Neill, Lee C. Godden, Elizabeth Jane Macpherson, Erin O'Donnell: *Australia, Wet or Dry, North or South*.

44 Gina Rinehart: *McMillan Woods Global Awards 2012 – Award for 'Visionary CEO of the year' Speech by Recipient Mrs Gina Rinehart*.

investment conditions for resource extraction have consistently failed to generate inclusive regional development outcomes.

ANDEV's promotion of special economic zones represents a contemporary version of enclave development approaches that have characterised the region's mining industry for decades. However, special economic zones do not address the structural constraints that have limited regional development: foreign ownership patterns, export orientation, and technological factors that favour capital-intensive over labour-intensive development would persist, limiting their capacity to generate different outcomes.

Historical Lessons and Future Choices

Conclusion

A fundamental paradox has persisted across seven decades of northern Australian economic development: the region's vast mineral wealth has supported foreign corporate profits and national export earnings while contributing minimally to regional development or community prosperity. Each mining boom has deepened rather than reduced the region's peripheral status, establishing patterns of foreign ownership and external control that persist despite massive investments in mining infrastructure and unprecedented commodity export revenues.

Northern Australia's experience from 1945-2015 demonstrates that resource abundance alone does not guarantee regional prosperity. The systematic failure to transform mineral wealth into sustained regional development reflects three critical structural factors that have shaped northern Australian development across multiple mining booms.

First, foreign ownership concentrated strategic decision-making outside Australia, limiting regional influence over development directions. The progression from 59 per cent foreign ownership in 1978 to 83 per cent by 2010 demonstrates deepening external control, with corresponding reductions in regional capacity to influence development outcomes.

Second, export orientation integrated northern Australia into global commodity systems of provision as a raw materials supplier rather than a centre of value-added production. The failure to develop processing industries represents foregone opportunities worth billions of dollars annually, as demonstrated by the bauxite industry's potential to generate five times more value through aluminium processing than bauxite exports.

The mining tax episode of 2010-2014 demonstrated the political constraints on redirecting resource wealth toward regional development, revealing the extent of corporate influence over democratic decision-making. The failure of this reform attempt highlighted the structural power imbalances that favour transnational corporations over regional communities and democratic institutions.

Northern Australia's historical experience challenges the assumption that market-driven resource development will automatically generate regional prosperity. The region's continuing underdevelopment despite extraordinary

resource endowments suggests that alternative development models are necessary; models that prioritise regional development outcomes in northern Australia over dividends for shareholders currently reaping benefits from mining that are disproportionate to their contribution to extractive industry.

A decade on from the mining tax debacle and familiar themes appear in new guises. Rio Tinto's profits dropped 16 per cent in the first half of 2020 to a mere \$4.81 billion "reporting its smallest first-half underlying profit since 2020 and the lowest interim dividend in seven years" due to "falling iron ore prices and rising costs in Australia".⁴⁵ On 24 May 2020 people working for Rio Tinto destroyed 46 000 year old artefacts in Juukan Gorge, including a "kangaroo leg bone dating back 28 000 years which had been sharpened into a pointed tool — the oldest examples of bone technology found in Australia".⁴⁶ Puutu Kunti Kurrama and Pinikura (PKKP) traditional owners discovered the destruction by accident after seeking permission from Rio Tinto to visit the site ahead of National Aboriginal and Islander Day Observance Committee (NAIDOC) week celebrations. Ministerial consent for the blast was granted in 2013 but a statement from Rio Tinto released three days after the incident "apologised that the PKKP's 'recently expressed concerns' did not arise 'through the engagements that have taken place over many years under the agreement that governs our operations on their country'".⁴⁷ Mining magnate Clive Palmer spent \$60 million on campaign advertising ahead of the 2019 federal election claiming he "decided to polarise the electorate" with an "anti-Labor advertising blitz in the final weeks of the election campaign, rather than attempting to win seats for his United Australia Party".⁴⁸ The Labor Party's analysis of the unexpected election loss notes that,

The anti-Adani campaign entrenched the view that Queensland mining communities that the progressive parties considered their jobs unworthy, reinforcing the divide between 'self' and 'other', where the 'other' were southerners telling Queenslanders how to live their lives. The entire communities of central and north Queensland reacted savagely to this perception, voting strongly against Labor and the Greens.⁴⁹

The following year Queensland's Supreme Court ruled that Palmer did not have to pay the remaining \$102 million that liquidators were pursuing after the 2016 collapse of his company Queensland Nickel left \$200 million in outstanding debts, including unpaid worker entitlements for those who lost their jobs at the Yabulu nickel refinery in Townsville. Palmer stands accused by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission of "misusing his position as a company director" in the lead up to the company being placed into voluntary administration.⁵⁰ Meanwhile the Queensland government cut a deal with Adani in August 2020 to defer royalties in exchange for a \$50 million expansion of the Carmichael

45 Melanie Burton, Sameer Manekar, Clara Denina: Rio Tinto Logs Smallest First-Half Profit in Five Years on Lower Iron Ore Prices.

46 Michelle Stanley, Kelly Gudgeon: Pilbara Mining Blast Confirmed to Have Destroyed 46 000yo Sites of 'Staggering' Significance.

47 Edie Hofmeister, Amandeep Sandhu: Opinion.

48 Ben Smee: Clive Palmer Says He 'Decided to Polarise Electorate' with Anti-Labor Ads to Ensure Coalition Win.

49 Craig Emerson, Jay Weatherill: Review of Labor's 2019 Federal Election Campaign, p. 62.

50 Mark Ludlow: Clive Palmer Won't Have to Pay Last \$100M in QNI Debts.

coal mine operation in Central Queensland.⁵¹ The mine began production in 2021 and Adani has paid royalties of around \$78.6 million in 2025 and \$83.5 million in 2024 but not a cent in corporate income tax due to reporting no profits despite earning \$1.27 billion in revenue in 2025.⁵² Over a decade has passed since the controversial mine was approved by the Queensland government with a pledge from Adani that it would contribute around \$22 billion in taxes and royalties over the course of the operation.⁵³

The choice facing the people of northern Australia remains clear: continue expanding extractive industries under foreign ownership and control, accepting the patterns of regional underdevelopment that have characterised the past seven decades, or develop alternative approaches that harness the region's natural wealth for genuine regional transformation. History demonstrates that the former path leads to continued underdevelopment despite resource abundance, while the latter requires challenging powerful interests but offers the possibility of finally realising northern Australia's potential for supporting prosperous and sustainable communities.

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- 51 See Jack McKay: Queensland Government Strikes New Deal with Bravus to Defer Royalties, Expand Carmichael Coal Mine.
- 52 See Jonathan Barrett: Adani Promised Australia Billions from Its Carmichael Mine but It Hasn't Paid A Cent in Tax.
- 53 See Jonathan Barrett: Despite \$22bn Promise, Adani has Paid Zero Corporate Tax in Australia and Experts Think It Won't Ever Pay A Cent.

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